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Editor's Note
On April 13, 2005, the JOURNAL hosted its first symposium.
Such an event is a significant undertaking, and the
JOURNAL is grateful for the special contributions made by
the following:
Dean Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.
Professor Penny White
Professor Otis Stephens
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Personal Stories
Beverly Jones & George Lane'
I. Ms. Beverly Jones:
Good afternoon. George has informed me that I am
to go first this afternoon, so I will take advantage of that.
My name is Beverly Jones, and let me first of all thank you
for allowing George and me to be a part of this symposium.
It is my first appearance since March 17, 2005 after the
case officially ended.
My personal story in relation to Tennessee v. Lane
2
began in 1990, upon my completion of court reporting
school. It was at that time that I found myself as a court
reporter relying on individual attorneys across the state to
hire me to go and report individual cases for them. On a
regular basis when I reported trials, I would encounter
courthouses that were inaccessible. Many courtrooms were
on the second and sometimes the third floor of buildings
that were not equipped with elevators. For many years in
order to continue working in these particular counties, and
these particular courthouses, I would have to ask for
assistance. This often required me to allow people to carry
me up the stairs. Most of the time, these people were
1 Ms. Jones and Mr. Lane joined as plaintiffs in Tennessee v. Lane. Ms.
Jones, who uses a wheelchair, is a certified court reporter. She was
compelled to decline employment because of her inability to gain
access to several courtrooms and related facilities in at least 24
Tennessee counties. Mr. Lane, also a wheelchair user, was charged
with a traffic violation in Polk County. The courtroom in which he was
required to appear on the appointed morning was located on the second
floor of a courthouse that was not equipped with an elevator. Mr. Lane
crawled up two flights of stairs in order to reach the courtroom, only to
have the case postponed until the afternoon session. Having returned to
the first floor, he refused to crawl up the stairs a second time and, as a
result, was jailed for contempt of court.
2 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
10
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complete strangers. The stairwells in these courthouses
were very narrow and very steep, with many turns and
flights of stairs to get to those second and third level
courtrooms.
As I became more familiar with the individuals I
was working with in these courthouses, I began to talk to
them along with others in county governments who ran the
judicial programs. We all agreed that there was a need for
access to the courtrooms. I started writing letters to
individuals and making phone calls in hopes that we would
find a solution and that I could find an answer to the
problems that I was facing.
I contacted the Governor's Committee for the
Employment of People with Disabilities; I contacted the
Department of Justice; I contacted the Legislative Action
Network; and I talked with the Administrative Office of the
Courts. I contacted Senator Al Gore's office and many,
many others, and voiced my concern about the inaccessible
courtrooms that I was encountering on a regular basis in the
areas in which I was traveling as a court reporter. The
responses from these individuals were usually similar in
that they all recognized and acknowledged that there was a
problem. Many of these individuals had their own stories
of instances that they had witnessed where an individual
with a disability could not access the courtroom. But no
one was quite sure what to do to solve the problem. After
many years of continuing speak with individuals in these
counties, I did begin to see changes.
I began to see courthouses installing elevators. I
began to see sidewalks outside courthouses replaced with
new sidewalks equipped with ramps. I began to see
courtrooms being built on first floors. I began to see
restrooms modified and made accessible, and I began to see
new [signs] in parking lots designating accessible parking.
Most of what were once entirely inaccessible courthouses
were now becoming accessible.
11
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A few courthouses remained inaccessible for as
long as six years after January 26th, 1992, the deadline date
of the Americans with Disabilities Act 3 for these
courthouses to come into compliance. In August of 1998, I
chose to personally sue the State of Tennessee about the
counties that remained inaccessible. The adventure that
followed the filing of this lawsuit will be spoken about by
some of the other speakers later this afternoon.
One of my most memorable recollections was being
present at the Supreme Court oral argument and hearing
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia describing being carried as a
mere inconvenience rather than a form of discrimination.
According to them, an offer to be carried provided access
to the courtroom. I will never forget their comments.
Seven years later, the few courthouses that remained have
come into compliance by making structural changes, or by
creating and implementing a policy on how to deal with a
situation when a person with a disability needs assistance to
the judicial program in that county. The State's policy also
speaks to that, and you will be hearing more about that later
this afternoon.
In my outline that I received from the college, they
asked me to talk about what this case means to me. I have
been asked that many times, and I think I've given a
different answer every time. I was reflecting back on
everything last night, and realized the outcome of this case
is significant to me because in the beginning, when I chose
to take on the counties that would not come into
compliance, it was not just about Beverly Jones needing to
go to work, it was not just about George Lane needing to
defend himself, it was about access to the judicial programs
of this State for every single person. The significance of
the outcome of Tennessee v. Lane, I believe, has been
accomplished in that the judicial program within the state is
readily accessible to everybody. Thank you.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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II. Mr. George Lane:
Well, I guess you all know I'm George Lane. I
would like to say it is an honor to be here. I am a big UT
fan. I became disabled after working 16 hour shifts and
falling asleep coming home from work. Paying taxes and
maintaining our government buildings does not say
anything for my character. I had no idea that the
[Americans with Disabilities Act] or any law of that sort
existed. I just knew that I was summoned to court for
driving on a revoked license. In the rural county where I
am from, you better get there, so I climbed up the steps and
it made a mockery of me, which is why I want to give a lot
of credit to my counsel who looked beyond the client and
looked at the cause. Therefore, you know, it is just-to
me-I have done several interviews, and I am sure if you
all have ever heard me talk, I live by the K.I.S.S. program,
"Keep it simple, stupid."
It is not real hard to see a person's needs, when he
has a fundamental right to access our government
buildings. This is America, not a third world country. I am
pleased with the changes that [have] occurred due to this
case, and just to know that-like Beverly said earlier-it is
not just about myself or Beverly. There are 250,000
disabled people in this state, 55 million people in the U.S.
To indirectly touch or to aid them in some way, I think it is
truly a blessing from God. I feel real fortunate just being a
part of it.
Like I say, when I first became disabled I was a
very angry man. [It] took my-it took my livelihood away,
I was unable to work. But God took a bad situation and
made it good. Now there is no one else in this state that
will ever have to crawl up some steps or to be carried to
perform her job. Like I say, I feel truly blessed to be a very
small part of a very good thing. And I give credit to God
and my counsel, Bill Brown and his assistant Lisa. That is
all I have got to say.
13
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Thank you, Mr. Stephens, I want to begin by
thanking the Tennessee College of Law and the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy for inviting my client and
friends, George Lane, Beverly Jones, and me to participate
in the symposium on the case. It is also a pleasure to renew
acquaintances with Solicitor General Moore, and Attorney
General Summers, with whom I had the occasion to share a
bit of history with on a cold day in January in Washington,
D.C. I am pleased to see Patty Millett visiting with us in
Tennessee. I can never say enough about the
encouragement and support she gave me during the course
of preparation for the argument before the Supreme Court
last year. For that I will be eternally grateful. As we
approach the anniversary of Tennessee v. Lane,2 it is
appropriate for us to reflect for a few moments on the
implications of that decision and appreciate the strategies
that were used to develop the issue that was decided.
Perhaps the first thing that we should address is: What was
the issue that was presented?
That simply stated is whether or not Congress
properly abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity against money damage claims by
average citizens when it passed Title II of the ADA.3 It
sounds like money. Little did I know in 1998 when I filed
the lawsuit that the implications would be considerably
more broad and dramatic. Please understand just how naive
1 Mr. Brown argued Tennessee v. Lane on behalf of the plaintiffs,
George Lane and Beverly Jones, before the United States Supreme
Court. He is a 1974 graduate of the Tennessee Technological
University and received his J.D. from the University of Tennessee
College of Law in 1977.
2 541 U.S. 549 (2004).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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I really was when I filed this lawsuit. I was a small town
lawyer who had primarily had a practice that consisted of
doing deeds, wills, and mundane areas of trial practice.
Most of my constitutional law experience was an
occasional foray into the Fourth Amendment when I had a
client that needed a break from criminal prosecution. I
heard in law school there was a principle of law kept you
from suing the state, but I thought Congress held the trump
card. When George Lane rolled into my office in 1996 and
told me about his experience in Polk County, Tennessee,
where he had to crawl up some steps to get to court because
he could not walk, and then was put in jail because he
refused to crawl or be carried, I thought that there was a
law that said a state could not do that.
I went to the U.S. Code Annotated, and there it was
in black and white. A state cannot discriminate against
people with disabilities who are otherwise qualified in its
programs and services because of that disability, period. In
another section, it said that if a state did, then the person
who had suffered that discrimination had a right to exercise
all remedies including remedies at law and in equity, and
that the state could not claim immunity.
Boy, this case looked like a slam dunk. It was
obvious. I thought I could file suit, make the State and
counties fix the courthouses like they were supposed to,
maybe collect some money for George and Beverly, and
maybe make some money for myself. Little did I know the
road would be a lot longer, and the implications would
involve the viability of Title II of the Americans with
Disability Act, and the ultimate question of what power
Congress really had under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to make states fulfill their fundamental
responsibilities to their citizens under the Constitution.
In August of 1998, I filed suit in federal district
court in Nashville on behalf of George and Beverly against
the State of Tennessee and twenty-five counties claiming
these public entities had discriminated against George,
16
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Beverly, and all other citizens of the State of Tennessee
with mobility disabilities because they conducted their
judicial program in inaccessible courthouses. I asked the
court to make them fix the program, to pay my clients
money for damages for the discrimination they suffered,
and to pay me some attorney's fees for having to bring the
lawsuit.
My secretary told me that the state attorney
general's office called and said they wanted to talk to me. I
remember thinking to myself, "They want to settle!" I got
on the phone, [and] they asked me if the State could have
[an] extension of time to answer the complaint. I agreed to
the request for an extension and I remember rocking back
in my chair and saying, "Why do they want to embarrass
themselves by having to admit everything?" The facts were
not seriously in dispute, I had pictures of the courthouses
and a ton of twists to what had happened to George and
Beverly, there really was not a material issue of fact for the
plaintiffs. We were not going to settle this month, but
maybe soon.
A couple of weeks later, I received the State's
motion for the case to be dismissed because of its Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, which when I read it
through, I thought was silly. After all, didn't Congress pass
a law saying that a state's sovereign immunity had been
done away when it came to the ADA? Again, I thought
this would be a slam dunk in reading over the state's
memorandum of news, City of Boerne v. Flores.4 This case
had been issued the year before, and the Court had directly
pronounced the meaning of the Constitution, and that
Congress could not overturn the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution. Boerne was the beginning of a steady
stream of cases where the Supreme Court began to restrict
Congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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I filed my response to the State's motion to dismiss
and [waited] for the decision. Several weeks later I received
a copy of a document in the mail from the clerk's office,
and noticed at the bottom of the page in longhand that I
could barely read, Judge Higgins, our federal district judge,
had written "State's motion to dismiss is denied," with his
signature. So much for memorandum opinions.
I understood this to mean that he agreed with me
and there really was not much to the State's motion to
dismiss. A few weeks later I received another pleading
from the State. This time they were appealing the case to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, as well as
asking the court to stay all proceedings pending the appeal.
I knew then the State really did not want to answer my
complaint.
The district court state proceedings resulted in a
stay of all the proceedings against the counties. If we could
not get injunctive relief to fix the courthouses, we were
dead in the water. We were not going to settle the case that
month.
[I] went to Cincinnati to argue the case, and the
federalism storm clouds were getting darker. The State
argued forcefully because Title II involves a class of
individuals that are disabled, under City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,5 only a rational basis [test was
applied] for the state[s] to treat individuals with disability
differently under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As such, the State argued that under Boerne,
Congress had overstepped its authority because it was
preventing states from treating people with disabilities
differently. As long as their conduct was rational, states
were constitutionally permitted to discriminate. This was
terribly wrong, especially with reference to our case. After
all, we were not just talking about any program, we were
talking about the fundamental right of access to the courts.
5473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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It struck me as the ultimate insult to say to disabled
citizens that everyone has a fundamental right of access to
the courts except you, and that only a rational basis test
would be applied to your right to access that program, and
if the sovereign cannot afford to fix that program, well,
tough luck.
When Congress passed the ADA, they made a
specific finding that those with disabilities were a discreet
and insular minority that was powerless to defend its rights.
When we had oral argument in the Sixth Circuit, the panel
hearing the case seemed to be buying into the Congress's
argument. While we were waiting for the court to decide
our case, the Supreme Court delivered its opinions in
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank6 and Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents. Cases were being delivered by
the Court striking down congressional attempts to take
away state sovereign immunity. None of these, however,
involve the Americans with Disability Act.
Then the Court delivered its opinion in Board of
Trustees v. Garrett.8 This was the first time the court had
dealt with the ADA on the issue of money damages against
the state. The issue presented for the Court allowed the
Court to deal with both Title I and Title II of the ADA.
The Court continued its rightward march. In a vote
of five to four with Kennedy and O'Connor concurring, the
Court struck down congressional action in abrogating a
state's sovereign immunity, but it only resolved Title I
claims associated with employment. It specifically
deferred Title II and government programs to a different
day.
Needless to say, there were few who supported the
ADA who had much hope for the continued viability of the
6 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
8531 U.S. 356 (2001).
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Americans with Disability Act. We did not hear from the
Sixth Circuit for over two years.
In July of 2002, the Circuit Court issued apro curia
opinion affirming the decision over the district court. We
had won again. This was in spite of Garrett and clearly
bucking the collective trend in the Supreme Court and
circuits. For some reason, this conservative circuit court
just could not hold that Congress did not have the power to
keep people from having to crawl or be carried up steps to
get to court.
The State asked the Court to reconsider and the
Court took it under advisement. They thought about it until
January 10, 2003, and again ruled in our favor. We waited
for several months to see what the State was going to do,
and we got their application for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. I realized I was not going to get the case
settled that month either.
We filed our response and waited for the Court to
determine if certiorari would be granted. During that time
there was a tremendous pressure from disability rights
community on the State to drop their appeal. We, likewise,
came under extensive pressure from many in the disability
rights community to not go forward and to withdraw our
claim for monetary damages.
There was a common feeling that this case could
make or break the ADA, and some advocates in the
disability community were not willing to take the risk. My
attitude was that if we cannot win this one, what could we
win? Certiorari was granted, we waited on the State's
brief. When we received it, we went to work on ours. I
was very fortunate to have the able assistance of Sam who
taught constitutional law at Harvard and was an expert on
disability rights. Tom Goldstein, of the firm of Goldstein
& Howe, also assisted us on our brief. We went round and
round about various approaches to take on the brief.
We knew there were two strengths we had. First,
there was the fact [that] it does not sound right to have
20
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people having to crawl upstairs to get to court to a bunch of
lawyers, especially if the alternative is for the lawyers to
carry them. The second thing was that we had the strong
counter to the Cleburne rational basis standard, the issue of
fundamental rights. The problem we confronted was that
while our case implicated fundamental rights, Title II
implicated everything including, as the State strategically
spoke about, rest stops on the interstate. The breadth of
Title II posed a difficult problem that would be difficult to
cover in a maximum 50 page brief. We ran into the
problem of running out of pages before we could finish the
second prong if we had to cover everything.
Sam Bagentoss suggested the "as applied" analysis,
that is to say that we would ask the Court not to feel
compelled to address all aspects of Title II, but only
consider whether Title II was constitutional as it applied to
the fundamental right of access to the courts. This allowed
us to focus the Court's attention on what was a serious
problem with serious facts concerning a fundamental right.
It also gave us the strategic advantage of keeping the
Court's attention on access to the courts and not access to
rest stops. Besides, Patty Millett and the Justice
department would have to cover everything else and we
knew they would do a splendid job.
We filed our brief, and I started attending some
moot court sessions, all of which Patty Millett participated
in. The first one I went to was in December of 2004, about
a month before the oral argument. I had a panel of eight
experienced constitutional lawyers, all of whom had argued
numerous times before the Supreme Court to serve as my
moot justices.
It was a grueling experience to say the least. And
[it] lasted for about an hour and a half. Then they got to tell
me what they really thought of my presentation. Now, you
need to understand the moot took six times the length of
time I would have before the Court. I did not have a
chance to catch my breath or collect my thoughts while
21
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being pounded by a group of lawyers who not only
practiced constitutional law, but also argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court for a living. You can imagine what they
thought of me and it was not good.
It was after that experience that the implications of
Tennessee v. Lane really hit me square in the face. One of
my colleagues sat me down and told me that the future of
55 million Americans with disabilities was riding on my
shoulders. He was not optimistic. I filed a lawsuit to get a
little money for George and Beverly which had evolved
into a question of whether or not 55 million Americans
could be denied their fundamental rights of citizenship. My
shoulders were really sagging under the responsibilities.
This was serious business.
I arrived at the court on the morning of January
13th, 2004, I had worked hard, gone through two or more
moots, [and] listened to fifteen Supreme Court arguments
that were available online. Ours was the first case on the
docket and General Moore opened the argument. Some of
the first questions that were posed to him were by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor.
Now, with the five to four split in Garrett, we knew
we had to change one vote-it had to be either Kennedy or
O'Connor, and I was looking to O'Connor. She had a
history of being pragmatic with a common sense approach
to most of her decisions associated with civil rights. My
reading of her was that she wanted people to be treated
properly, with respect and dignity without placing a too
onerous burden on the states. I was also optimistic about
her because she had been a state trial judge that had to deal
with real people in a personal way. I suspected that in
Arizona she had to deal with old, uncomfortable
courthouses, stubborn county commissions, and perhaps
had even seen a few people carried up steps in her life's
experience. She might not buy everything in Title II, but I
felt that she would not be comfortable letting the state get
22
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 515
by with having people crawl up steps to get to court.
Justice O'Connor's questions were direct and simple.
She asked, "Mr. Moore, does Tennessee provide
any cause of action for the alleged violations here? The
lack of access to the courthouse?" He candidly responded,
"No - there is no private action under our State Public
Buildings Act."9 She asked him again, "You're satisfied
under Tennessee law there would be no monetary relief
available?" He responded, "I think that is right." She then
asked him a third question: "And would there be any
enforcement actions at all available to compel under
Tennessee law the courthouse to be accessible?" He
answered, "No, your Honor." The argument went another
fifteen minutes including my fifteen minutes, but after
those three questions I felt confident our strategy had
worked. Sandra Day O'Connor was not about to leave my
clients without a remedy against the denial of their
fundamental rights.
On May 17th, 2004, the court announced the
decision in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens. We
had won by a 5-4 vote with Justice O'Connor in the
majority. Justice Stevens focused on exactly what we had
set out for them, [that] access to the courts is a fundamental
right and there is ample history in the record that Congress
generated that supports the conclusion that the states have
unconstitutionally discriminated against people with
disabilities in the administration of their programs. In
conclusion, the Court need only consider Title II in the
context of access to the court and we will leave to another
day the abrogation of sovereign immunity with reference to
other programs.
Justice O'Connor did not write a word, but her
influence and belief in civil rights is clearly there.
There was hope that the purposes for which Title II
was passed would be a reality. The potential for disaster,
9 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-120-201 to -205 (2005).
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for not only disability rights but all aspects of civil rights, is
starkly contained in the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Scalia. The Chief Justice rejected the "as
applied" inquiry. More significantly, the Chief Justice said
that there was nothing unconstitutional about George Lane
having to crawl up the stairs to get to court, nor was there
anything unconstitutional about his being arrested for
refusing to be carried. In fact, it was perfectly acceptable.
After all, he did get to court. George Lane's
inconvenience, his words, of having to crawl to his day in
court was not in his opinion unconstitutional. He
commented that, "Jones, a disabled court reporter, does not
seriously contend that she suffered a constitutional injury."
I was trying to be as serious as I could get. The principle
that bad conduct by states towards its citizens, even if
illegal and discriminatory, is never unconstitutional almost
became the law of the land.
Justice Scalia's dissent was even more drastic. His
view would, in effect, abolish the ability of Congress to
enact prophylactic [legislation] under the Fourteenth
Amendment in any area except race. In other words,
Congress has no general prospective power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect citizens from the denial
of due process of law or the equal protection of the laws in
any area except race. This conclusion, if held by a majority
of the Court, would have completely emasculated the
Fourteenth Amendment. It provides protection from
arbitrary acts by states against their citizens. Those citizens
would not be subject to any protection by Congress,
without the Fourteenth Amendment, which extends the
right of private litigants to bring actions to vindicate their
civil rights. It would bring in serious question whether
Congress had the power to pass legislation that gave
authority to the federal executive branch to intervene in
federal courts on behalf of citizens who were being
deprived of fundamental rights on grounds other than race.
The one caveat was that Congress could conduct trials
24
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directly at specific states and state actors where there had
been an identified history of "relevant constitutional
violations." That, of course, would never happen. What
senator would ever let his state be singled out for a trial by
Congress, let alone allow a finding of relevant
constitutional findings?
In addition, remember that under Boerne, the
Supreme Court decides what is and is not constitutional. If
the principle that bad conduct is not unconstitutional
conduct was the law of the land, there may not have been
any civil rights to protect. This would turn on its head the
concept that the role of Congress is to pass laws that
regulate conduct, not to make findings of fact in order to
punish conduct. The implications of the issue for the Court
in Tennessee v. Lane were broader than money damages
under Title II. The power of Congress to protect citizens
with or without disabilities from the denial of fundamental
rights was eerily at stake. Because of the shift of one vote
by one justice, perhaps the whole concept of civil rights
was saved.
I never dreamed my little case to fix the courthouses
and get George and Beverly a little money would bring our
country back from the brink of the abolition of the power of
Congress to guarantee the civil rights of all of us, even in
areas other than disabilities. Should a person be denied
their rights of citizenship because they are disabled?
Hopefully the answer to that question will never
again be seriously in doubt. The real hope for individuals
with disabilities under Title II is not that they will be able
to collect money from states, it is that they will be treated
like any other citizen and they will not have to sue every
time they want or need to access a state program. With the
decision in Tennessee v. Lane, it is clear that they are
citizens whose fundamental rights under the Constitution
can be protected by congressional action. Hopefully, they
will be expanded to other programs and services as applied
analysis is developed. The best news for George and
25
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Beverly is the state has adopted procedures that no person
has to crawl up steps to get to a court of law. For me, I
finally got this case settled.
26
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 519
27
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 520
United States's Legal Strategy
Patricia Millett'
First of all, I want to thank you for inviting me here
today. It is a privilege to be here, and I hope all of you law
students realize that something very exceptional is
happening here. You all have probably spent one, two, or
three years talking about legal issues like those we litigated
in the Supreme Court. When I went to law school, nobody
spent much time teaching that there are real people behind
cases, and that before you get to go to the Supreme Court,
you have to have a client willing to make that fight. That is
how it works. Law school is a wonderful place, but you
always have to remember that there are real people behind
every case, and I think that has really come home today. It
has been a privilege to hear these stories.
When Mr. Lane said that he was a small part of a
big case, he was wrong. He and Ms. Jones are the case. It
is too easy, particularly for those of us that practice in front
of the Supreme Court, to forget that and just get wrapped
up in the legal issues. I hope you will take that message
home with you. It is certainly something that I will
remember.
I work in the Solicitor General's Office of the
United States Department of Justice and we represent the
U.S. government in the Supreme Court. While it is always
a privilege to handle a case in the Supreme Court, there are
some cases-and this is one-that I will remember
throughout my career. That is not only because of the
interesting legal issues, but most importantly the human
implications of the case for people who face exceptional
challenges and ask for nothing more than fair treatment and
consideration by their government.
1 Ms. Millet is an Assistant to the Solicitor General. She is a Harvard
Law School graduate.
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This case was between Beverly Jones, George Lane,
and the State of Tennessee. Why was the U.S. government
in this case? "We're your government, we are here to
help," I told Mr. Brown. He did not seem to believe me at
first. One of the jobs the Justice Department and the
Solicitor General's office do is defend the constitutionality
of federal law. So, while Mr. Brown just happened to get a
case with this great issue-great federal courts and
constitutional law issues-we had been battling with the
Supreme Court on these issues for years, although we had
not been doing very well. Mr. Brown could be justifiably
unenthusiastic at our arrival on the scene-we came to him
armed with losses in City of Boerne v. Flores,2 Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents,3 and Board of Trustees- v.
Garrett.4 Although, to our credit, in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,5 we finally won one. So
maybe we had a little credibility with him.
Tennessee v. Lane6 was case number five in what
thus far had been an ever-expanding list of federalism
losses. The Supreme Court had been cutting back on
Congress's power to enact laws that applied to the states,
both under Section 5, the civil rights power, and the
Commerce Clause power as well. So, at some level, we
were beginning to feel that our job had become to show up
every term of the Supreme Court with a "kick me again"
sign. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
7
while finally decided in part in this case-still not totally
resolved, which I will get to-had already been before the
court multiple times. They had granted certiorari to decide
this issue since the year 2000 in Kimel, in which the
Supreme Court decided Congress did not have the power to
2 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
3 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
4531 U.S. 356 (2001).
5 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
6 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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require the states to pay damages for violations of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.8 There was also a
disability claim in that case. After they decided the age
issue, they granted certiorari to decide the disability issue.
That case was settled.
Then they granted review in a case coming out of
the Eighth Circuit involving a police officer who had
somewhat limited vision, but performed perfectly fine on a
shooting test. That case was settled.
Then there was the Court's decision in Garrett,
where the Supreme Court decided that Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which applies to
employment, was not a proper exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, the term before Lane, we briefed the
constitutionality of Title II in a case coming out of
California that dealt with medical licenses for doctors.
That case was dismissed by California shortly before oral
argument. We had been dealing with this issue for quite
some time, and Supreme Court precedent gave little reason
for optimism. We were very conscious of the barriers that
we faced in front of the Supreme Court. Now we do not
have individual clients in the sense that Mr. Brown did.
Our client is the U.S. government and the power of
Congress to enact its laws. Our goal was to stop the
hemorrhaging of congressional power to enforce civil
rights. We accordingly wanted to have Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act upheld as broadly as
possible. Because of what had gone before, there were
some important decisions that needed to be made. After
all, when we first briefed this issue, we did not have
Garrett on the books.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court had held that just a
couple pages in the U.S. Code before Title II there is
another section of the Americans with Disabilities Act-
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2005).
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Title I-that is not Section 5 legislation. That is a really
hard precedent to wrestle with. Have you ever been in a
case where they have already held that another part of the
act is unconstitutional? But there was more.
How many of you have heard of a case called Buck
v. Bell?9 Did you hear about that case in favorable terms?
Probably not. Buck was an old Justice Holmes decision
upholding the power of government to sterilize the
mentally retarded. It is generally consigned to the Dred
Scott l° trash bin of judicial decision-making. At least that
is how I learned it in law school, because the Court, in
Buck, seemed to sign onto the whole eugenics movement.
They endorsed the notion that, if you are mentally retarded,
you are the product of bad blood and we should try to
purify society by preventing you from reproducing and, in
that mindset, perpetuating the so-called "problem." It is
terrible language.
In Garrett, the Supreme Court cited that decision,
but not with much blushing. In response to our argument in
that case about a history of discrimination on the basis of
disability and our arguments about the history of
sterilization, the Court responded with "We upheld those.
See Buck v. Bell." Now, I am not suggesting the Court
would decide the case the same today. It would not. But
Buck is evidence of discrimination in our history.
That is where we found ourselves when Lane arose,
which is why we were so cautionary while Mr. Brown was
so optimistic. To Mr. Brown, disability discrimination
seemed so self-evidently a problem. But we were very
conscious that we had to establish special protections for
people with disabilities to overcome a history of
discrimination.
That is what had been recognized in the race
discrimination area. Congress had to have special powers
9 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
10 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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to overcome race discrimination because it was so
embedded. Gender discrimination was the same in Hibbs.
I had thought it was simple at first, too, when I first
came to the Americans with Disabilities Act. I thought the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1 was largely Congress
in a turf fight with the Supreme Court, eyeball to eyeball
and toe to toe over fundamental conceptions of religious
freedom. But if anything it is Section 5 legislation. If there
is anything Congress is especially equipped to do, it is
protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities because
there is a real history of discrimination in this country.
Sterilization, institutionalization, preventing people from
voting, refusing employment, excluding them from
schools-it is all chronicled in our brief. There is a real,
undeniable history of discrimination here, a complex
history. 1In Cleburne,12 the reason the Supreme Court
applied rational basis analysis was not because they did not
think disability discrimination was a problem. The
rationale in Cleburne was, instead, that the legislature
needs to deal with the recognized problem of disability
discrimination. It is very complicated, and it entails careful
line-drawing and balancing a lot of information that courts
do not have. Cleburne was an institutional decision about
who was better positioned to protect people with
disabilities. I thought Title II is exactly what Section 5
legislation should be. But then along came Garrett.
Since Garrett, the Supreme Court had upheld the
Family Medical Leave Act' 3 in Hibbs. That was our first
law upheld as proper Section 5 legislation since City of
Boerne, and that involved gender discrimination. The
opinion accepted the argument that where there is a
recognized history of discrimination such that the Supreme
" 42 U.S.C §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2005).
12 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
"3 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2005).
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Court itself has applied heightened scrutiny and thus has
recognized the problem, Congress has greater leeway under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. When you see the
briefs and the arguments in Tennessee v. Lane, there was a
lot of focus on rights subject to heightened security.
Yes, we made the straightforward argument about
disability discrimination under the equal protection clause.
The oral argument also brought up questions about the right
to go to the ice skating rink, though. Quite frankly, why
shouldn't somebody be able to go to a public skating rink
just because they have a disability? If it only costs fifty
cents to make the doors wider, do it so that all your
citizens-all the people government is supposed to work
for-can go ice skating. But we also spent a lot of time
focusing on the fundamental rights that are implicated by
disability discrimination, whether access to the courts,
Eighth Amendment violations in prisons and mental
institutions, First Amendment rights, or the right to vote.
In framing the arguments, there was a focus on the
fundamental rights aspect because it had worked so far
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When you read the briefs, the other thing that
becomes clear is that the prior cases where the Supreme
Court had held Congress lacked Section 5 authority (other
than Boerne) involved only claims for damages. They
generally involved employment cases, where the substance
of the law could be sustained as Commerce Clause
legislation. There, thus, was no question that Congress
could pass the law and make the states comply with the
law. The Court just held that states do not have to pay
damages. That is the import of the Section 5 ruling in those
cases. The same was true for Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. It is not totally unconstitutional. It still
applies to the states as Commerce Clause legislation,
however no damages can be awarded.
The difficulty with Title II, as we saw it, is it is less
clear. It would be an open question in the Supreme Court's
33
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 526
view-whether the Title is Commerce Clause legislation.
We defend it as Commerce Clause legislation, but it is
challenging in some applications to identify the Commerce
Clause nexus. Access to polling place cases is difficult to
justify as commerce. However, we would win the ice
skating rink-that is commerce. In the brief we tried to
paint a picture of where an adverse holding on the Section
5 power would leave us.
If the Supreme Court says Title II is not valid
Section 5 legislation, and if they were to say that its
application to state capital buildings, state courthouses, and
state polling places is not Commerce Clause legislation,
then where would that leave our country? You would be
able to get into any building, any McDonald's in the
country, and any private building of a requisite size. You
could get into your ice skating rink and your county park
facilities. But you could not get into your capital or your
courthouse, and you could not get into polling places to
vote. How can that be how our Constitution leaves things?
How could a constitutional amendment enacted after the
Civil War to empower then predominantly African-
Americans, freed slaves, have that result? Certainly the
concern of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers was not to
get freed slaves into ice skating rinks.
That was the image our brief attempted to leave in
the Supreme Court's mind.
One more thing about strategies in the case: there
was a significant distinction between our brief and Mr.
Brown's. I think it was helpful for the Supreme Court to
have the two approaches. He focused heavily on access to
the courts and on the "as applied" challenge. You can
argue that something is unconstitutional facially anyway
that it is applied. You also can argue that a law is
unconstitutional in one application and not another.
What Mr. Brown argued is that the court did not
have to decide congressional power to enact all of Title II.
After all, it is a big statute, and it covers everything the
34
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 527
government does-ice skating rinks to courthouses. All he
needed for his clients to win was access to the courts,
which is a clear fundamental right that is not subject to
rational basis scrutiny under Cleburne. It is specially
protected by the Constitution and the Court, and so
Congress has leeway.
Our job is to defend Title II as a whole, from ice
skating rinks to courthouses. So we argued in our brief that
the Court should decide the constitutionality of Title II as a
whole. After all, the whole concept of Section 5 legislation
is that Congress can do more than outlaw things that are
unconstitutional. All of your rights against race and gender
discrimination in employment encompass a lot more than
just what the Constitution requires.
The Family Medical Leave Act certainly provides
more than what the Constitution requires. Congress can
give more under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
than the bare minimum constitutional protection. Our view
was, as some of the states had argued, that the "as applied"
approach would be used to divide and conquer
congressional legislation. Our concern was if you tear this
statute apart and look at it in each application, and ask if we
really need it in each context, the Court will say that you-do
not really need it here, or here, or here. Certainly not in
this day and age. If they could do that, they might also say
a ban on intentional gender discrimination is appropriate
Section 5 legislation, but a ban on employment practices
with a disparate impact is not. Given our general lack of
success in the Supreme Court in recent cases, we thought it
was dangerous to argue that Title II should be divided up
that way and start scrutinizing each application of the
statute. So the Supreme Court had both proposed
approaches before it.
As you know, the Supreme Court did uphold Title
II, but only as applied to access to the courts claims. It was
a great victory, it is a wonderful opinion, it decided a lot of
important issues, and will help with the defense of other
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statutes. But we still have the question of where do we go
after Tennessee v. Lane.
We now have to defend Title II in all of its other
applications. We just filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
last month for the Supreme Court to address the
constitutionality of Title II in the context of prison
administration. There is a division in the circuit courts.
One has upheld it, two have struck it down. There was a
recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit a few days ago
upholding Title II as applied to education, but the same
issue is also being litigated elsewhere. We cannot sit back
and say we are done. There are still many more
applications to be dealt with, and it will be up to the
Supreme Court to sort out exactly what lines it wants to
draw on congressional power or whether it will, at the end
of the day, hold, as it should, that Title II in all of its
applications is constitutional. Thank you very much.
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Tennessee's Legal Strategy
The Honorable Michael Moore'
The State of Tennessee did not anticipate that Lane
2
would be the first case through which the Court would
address the Title II sovereign immunity issue. We fully
recognized that its unattractive facts made the case a
particularly unfavorable vehicle for that purpose. By the
time the Sixth Circuit finally disposed of the State's
petition for panel rehearing in January 2003, the Supreme
Court had already granted review in Medical Board of
California v. Hason,3 a case from the Ninth Circuit that
presented the sovereign immunity issue in a far more
favorable light from the perspective of the States.
We thus had every reason to believe that, when the
time arrived to file our petition for certiorari in Lane in the
Spring of 2003, Hason would already have been argued and
submitted, and that the Court would simply hold our
petition pending its decision in Hason. Then, most likely,
the Court would remand our case to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of Hason. But, in an extraordinary
turn of events, just a few weeks before Hason was to be
argued and after the case had been fully briefed on the
merits, California abruptly asked that its certiorari petition
in that case be dismissed, a request that the Court obliged.
Thus, Lane came front and center as the next available case
that might be used to address the issue. Within a matter of
weeks after Hason had been dismissed, Tennessee filed its
petition for certiorari in Lane; respondents Lane and Jones,
as well as the United States, promptly filed responses that
essentially acquiesced in a grant; and the Court granted the
petition at the end of the Term in late June 2003.
1 Michael Moore is the Tennessee Solicitor General.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
' 279 F.3d 1167 ( 9 th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002).
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Our petition for certiorari framed two questions for
the Court's consideration. The first presented the generic
sovereign immunity issue: whether Title II of the ADA
4
exceeded Congress's authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, failed validly to abrogate
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private
damages actions. The second question asked the Court
specifically to address the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the
outcome of the sovereign immunity analysis should vary
depending upon the nature of the constitutional right
implicated by the particular allegations of the Title II claim
in each case, a "context-specific" approach that in our view
was wholly inconsistent with the Court's prior abrogation
jurisprudence. The Court limited its grant of certiorari to
the first question, an action suggesting to us that our
opening brief should concentrate on demonstrating why
Title II, viewed in its entirety, failed the "congruence and
proportionality" test for valid abrogations of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
It is often said that the skill that is most essential to
conducting a successful Supreme Court practice is the
ability to count to five. Since all nine of the current
Justices had written extensively on the subject of sovereign
immunity during the previous decade, we were able to
predict with a high degree of confidence that, no matter
how the parties briefed the case, the States could not win
the votes of Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, or Ginsburg
and that, just as surely, we should be able to count on the
vote of the Chief Justice as well as those of Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Accordingly, our goal as
we approached briefing the case was to construct an
argument that maximized our opportunity to attract (or,
more precisely, to hold) the critical fifth vote needed to win
the case-the vote of Justice O'Connor.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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In our quest for that fifth vote, we were presented
with a tactical dilemma of sorts. On the one hand, the
strongest argument in favor of immunity and against
abrogation derives from the sheer breadth of Title II. By
covering all "services, programs, and activities," the
legislation purports to regulate virtually everything a state
undertakes to do; Congress made no effort whatsoever to
tailor the law's provisions to those state activities that
might implicate the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights.
Moreover, the case law under Title II demonstrates
that it is most often applied in contexts that have nothing to
do with the exercise of constitutional rights (state parks,
highway rest areas, parking, performing arts centers,
museums, access to public gardens, etc.). The
"overbreadth" argument thus dictated that we emphasize
the operation of Title II as a whole and assert that the
Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity should be
invalidated in its entirety because Title II was not a
proportionate response to any demonstrated contemporary
pattern of constitutional violations of the rights of disabled
persons by the states. Indeed, for the most part, the statute
is unconcerned with protecting constitutional rights.
The "overbreadth" argument had the additional
virtue of allowing us to dwell at length upon Title II's quite
remarkable and unprecedented intrusion upon state
sovereignty while avoiding very much discussion of the
unattractive facts of our case.
But many Court-watchers more savvy than we
cautioned us that Justice O'Connor, even while
sympathizing with our view that Title II represented a
particularly egregious example of federal overreaching,
would be hesitant to strike down Title II in its entirety and
would perhaps find a narrower argument more palatable.
One that, for example, sought to sustain sovereign
immunity in public building access cases, but would leave
unresolved the validity of the Congressional abrogation in
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other contexts (e.g., in voting cases, education cases, or
cases involving the rights of institutionalized persons).
The problem with this approach, of course, was that
it would tend to blunt the impact of our strongest argument
(the statute's overbreadth) and would require us to confront
head on the application of Title II to courts and courthouses
(and, even more distastefully from our point of view, to
address Mr. Lane's and Ms. Jones' unfortunate experiences
at Tennessee's courthouses). The fear was that, if we were
forced to argue this case on the basis of its facts (rather than
on the basis of overarching principles of state sovereignty
and federalism), our prospects of attracting Justice
O'Connor's vote would be greatly diminished, and that we
might even run the risk of putting another friendly vote
(Justice Kennedy) in play. In the final analysis, the
divergent approaches taken by respondents Lane and Jones,
on the one hand, and by the United States, on the other,
forced us to embrace both tactics. The lawyers for Lane
and Jones did not even attempt to defend the breadth of
Title II; they argued instead that the validity of Title II's
abrogation of sovereign immunity should be considered on
a case-by-case basis and should be sustained in the
courthouse access context as a valid exercise of the federal
power to enforce the fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts. The United States, by contrast, urged
the Court to reject the respondents' context-specific
approach and went for broke, attempting to defend Title II
in its entirety.
The State was required to analyze the case under
both approaches. Our opening brief and half of our reply
emphasized the statute's indefensible overbreadth; the other
half of our reply argued that, even as applied in the narrow
courthouse access context, Title II exceeded Congress's
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment because
there was insufficient evidence presented to Congress that
the States were violating the constitutional rights of
disabled persons at courthouses.
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The decision of the five-member majority in Lane
turned out to be a relatively narrow one, the price (we
suspect) of persuading Justice O'Connor to join it.
Damages claims under Title II may proceed against the
States in cases involving the right of access to the courts
and (perhaps) in cases involving the exercise of other
fundamental constitutional rights. But the Court's opinion
expressly disavows any implication that it is intended to
authorize Title II damages claims in other contexts.5 The
lower federal courts appear to agree with our view of
Lane's narrow scope and have for the most part declined to
extend it beyond cases involving the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, the viability of
Title II's attempted abrogation of state sovereign immunity
remains largely unsettled after Lane. As one participant
observed at a seminar I recently attended concerning
Lane's impact, the future of damages claims against the
states under Title II may well depend upon how many of
the Justices are big hockey fans.
5 "Whatever might be said about Title H's other applications, the
question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly
subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to
provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but
whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional
right of access to the courts." Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
1992-93 (2004).
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Tennessee's Response to the Supreme Court's Decision
The Honorable Paul G. Summers & Ms. Elizabeth Martin'
I. General Summers:
The State of Tennessee has conceded from the
outset of the Lane2 litigation that the Americans with
Disabilities Act 3 applies to it and that its obligation to
comply with the ADA may be enforced by suits for
injunctive relief and attorneys' fees under Ex parte Young.
4
The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether or
not an individual could seek money damages from the State
for violations of the ADA. The Supreme Court held that
the State could be sued for damages in cases where a
violation of the constitutional right of access to the Courts
was proven. The State's vulnerability to damages claims in
other contexts remains an open question.
Because the State of Tennessee has always agreed
that it must comply with the ADA, the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lane is of limited practical
significance. The State of Tennessee has, and continues, to
accommodate persons with disabilities and does not
discriminate against persons with disabilities. Of course,
Title II of the ADA is applicable to many other areas of
state government in addition to the judicial program. A
brief review of the cases filed against the State of
Tennessee before and after the Supreme Court's decision in
Lane reveals that there has not been an increase in the
number of cases filed in all areas under Title II. Indeed, the
number of cases alleging disability discrimination is not
disproportionate to the number of cases filed against the
Paul G. Summers is the Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter.
Elizabeth Martin is an Assistant Tennessee Attorney General.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
4 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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State of Tennessee. That there has been no flood of
damages claims in the aftermath of Lane provides at least
circumstantial evidence for the proposition that the State's
record of compliance is adequate in most respects.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in
Tennessee v. Lane, the case was remanded to the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. A
settlement was negotiated between the State and the
plaintiffs. The settlement did not provide for damages by
the State. It provided only for payment of attorneys' fees
and that the State would take particular actions regarding
access to the courts by disabled persons. As a practical
matter, this outcome is exactly what plaintiffs could have
obtained from the State had they sued under Ex parte
Young for injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. As part of
that settlement, and with input from plaintiffs and their
lawyers, a specific policy was adopted by the Tennessee
Supreme Court to make certain that the Americans with
Disabilities Act was followed with regard to state court
proceedings.
This policy applies to all parties and attorneys as
well as to court personnel. A copy of that policy is
provided. This policy does not add any additional
obligations on the State of Tennessee but provides a
process for insuring compliance with the ADA.
Because Tennessee's judicial program involves the
intersection of state and local governments, the policy is
significant in its attempt to address all issues. However, the
burden of compliance remains on the governmental entity
involved, for the most part, the counties. In addition, the
Administrative Office of the Courts has implemented a
training plan to insure that all judges-both state and
local-as well as their assistants and clerks of courts are
trained regarding the requirements of the Policy on Judicial
Access. An ADA coordinator for access to the judicial
program has been assigned for each county to assist
persons with disabilities. This training has already begun.
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Even before the commencement of the Lane case,
most state court judges were working diligently to provide
access to the courts for necessary parties. However, due to
the unique nature of Tennessee's judicial system, including
municipal, county and state courts and the use of county
courthouses for state judicial proceedings, the courts'
record of compliance was not always consistent. Most of
the issues raised by the Lane litigation did not involve
intentional discrimination.
In Tennessee, every county is required to provide a
courthouse. 5 However, there are no provisions for funding
by the state and no requirements related to the physical
facilities beyond the simple requirement that there be a
courthouse and that it be located within the city limits of
the county seat. 6 But there are no provisions of state law
allowing the state court judges to enforce the requirements
of the ADA against the counties. Because the ADA allows
local and state governments to use alternative locations
rather than make extensive renovations, the policy on
access to the judicial program allows relocation of judicial
programs in order to comply with the ADA. This is not
new, but is a clarification of the State's policy.
Many of the judges already used alternative
locations. A number of the counties have made plans to
renovate the courthouses or to build new courthouses or
justice centers. This should alleviate problems involving
access by individuals with disabilities as well.
The issue of alternative locations was a major issue
in Lane. Mr. Lane's factual allegations in his complaint
included a claim that he was offered an alternative location
and he refused. Mr. Lane argued that the ADA required the
State or County to provide an elevator with access to a
second floor courtroom. While Mr. Lane has been
successful in encouraging some counties to make physical
5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-7-104 (2005).
6 1d. § 577-105.
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changes to their courthouses, the State has not agreed to
provide or require physical changes if alternative locations
can be used. Another issue raised by Plaintiffs was the
State's requirement that a person with a disability needing
an accommodation give reasonable notice to the Court in
order to obtain the accommodation. Plaintiffs argued that
this requirement was discriminatory.
The State disagreed and the policy ultimately
agreed upon includes a notice requirement.
One positive outcome of the Lane lawsuit is that the
Administrative Office of the Courts has recommended that
Tennessee Code Annotated § 22-2-304 be amended.
Subsection (c) of that statute currently provides that the
names of all persons "known by the commissioners to have
died or removed from the county or to have become
mentally or physically disabled" drawn for jury service
"shall be put aside and not used, and another name or
names shall be drawn in its or their stead.",7  The
application of this statute was not raised by any of the
plaintiffs. However, pending legislation deletes the
requirement that the names of disabled persons be set aside
and has been passed by the House (96-0). It will likely be
approved by the Senate this legislative session.
Two statutes relating to jury duty remain on the
books. First, Tennessee Code Annotated § 22-1-102(b)
provides, "Persons not in the full possession of the senses
of hearing or seeing shall be excluded from service on any
jury if the court determines, of its own volition or on
motion of either party, that such person cannot provide
adequate service as a juror on such jury.'' This seems to
be consistent with the ADA. In addition, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 22-1-103 exempts certain persons and
professions from jury service. The exemption includes
7 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-304(c) (2005).
8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-102(b) (2005).
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persons "disabled by bodily infirmity" 9 and "persons not in
the full possession of the senses of hearing or seeing."'
10
However, this exemption does not excuse or prevent
persons with disabilities from serving on a jury. It only
exempts the person from the initial summons and allows
the exempt person to choose the time frame for service.'l
This provision works well with the ADA Policy on Access
to the Judicial Program because the exemption allows the
prospective juror an opportunity to request any needed
accommodation and gives the Court the opportunity to
arrange for an accommodation such as an alternate location
or interpreter.
Another point to consider in assessing the impact of
Lane is to consider the impact of Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett12 throughout state
government. In Garrett, the Supreme Court held that
individuals could not bring claims for money damages
against the states for employment discrimination under
Title I of the ADA. Subsequent to Garrett, however, the
State of Tennessee continues to comply with the ADA in
the employment area. There is a written policy forbidding
disability discrimination in employment, an ADA
coordinator at each agency, and oversight by the Tennessee
Department of Personnel. Despite the fact that the State
has immunity from claims for money damages arising from
employment discrimination, the State continues to comply
with the ADA.
9 Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-1-103(a)(5) (2005).
'01 Id. § 22-1-103(a)(7).
" Id. § 22-1-103(c).
12 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
48
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 541
II. General Martin:
I will talk very briefly about the practical
implications of Lane for the State of Tennessee. As
General Summers pointed out, this case involved the
judiciary, not the executive branch. That is where the main
impact so far has been felt. We settled this case, and the
settlement resulted in our paying attorneys' fees, agreeing
to enter a policy that would address the issues of access to
the court, and providing training for the judges, clerks, and
the assistants to the court, to make sure the policy is
implemented. The policy that we implemented is
considered by a lot of people to be the blue ribbon policy.
There were not very many out there. The problem in the
judiciary is that it is a weird conjunction between states and
counties. The courthouses are county courthouses. The
Constitution in the State of Tennessee says the county has
to provide a courthouse. The State has state court, but state
court occurs in the courthouses supplied by the counties.
But the State has no authority to make the counties do
anything to their courthouses except have them. That puts
the State in an awkward position.
The Administrative Office of the Courts has
developed a policy that has been presented across the state.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has made this policy a
rule, which applies to every attorney. Attorneys have the
obligation to comply with the policy and make sure, if it is
necessary, that they raise it before the judge. Attorneys just
tell the judge they have a witness or plaintiff who needs to
be in court, and the judge must provide accommodations
under the rule. The rule is also applicable to a pro se
parties. If a pro se party knows they need special
accommodations, they have to ask for it.
Because of our unique position, some of the
courthouses are very old. They are on the national historic
register. They are impossible to renovate. There is simply
no way to put an elevator in. We were not in a position to
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ask the county to place elevators in their buildings. So we
arrange for alternative locations, clearly allowed by the
courts, with a little advanced notice. By allowing for
alternative locations, we believe we have complied with
Title II.
There are a few other policies which the State has
adopted. One, the Administrative Office of the Courts
submitted language to the legislature to change our jury
statute so disability is not taken into account in creating a
jury pool. That was not an issue in Lane, but it is a positive
outcome because it raised the bar.
While disability is no longer a factor for creating
juries, there is a statute which provides benefits for disabled
persons from serving on juries. The statute, which applies
to lawyers and doctors as well, allows people with
disabilities to choose one week during the year that they are
available to serve. This gives the court time to arrange an
alternative location or interpreter in order to accommodate
the person with a disability.
The statute also requires the judge to determine
whether the disabled person can serve as a juror. The
person's disability is only considered as it relates to the
specific case that the person has been called to sit on the
jury.
In 1999, I conducted one of the first training
sessions for the clerks of the courts. Throughout the time
that the ADA has been in effect, the State of Tennessee has
been attempting to train judges, clerks, general sessions
judges in how the ADA works. The State has also been
making sure our courts are accessible. That training is
continuing even now, and will continue for the next several
years in order to make certain that all the judges are aware,
and so our courts are, in fact, accessible to all persons
including those with disabilities.
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The Policy Implications
Elizabeth McCallum I
Good afternoon everybody. I want to thank the
JOURNAL for inviting me. It is an honor to be here in such
distinguished company.
I knew that the Tennessee v. Lane2 decision was a
tremendously important case to the millions of Americans
with disabilities, and I knew it was very interesting to
lawyers because of the complexity of the legal issues
involved. However, I did not realize how well-known the
case was in Tennessee until this morning when I was in a
taxicab on the way to the symposium from the airport. My
taxi driver asked why I was going to the law school. I said
I am going to speak in a symposium on the Supreme Court
decision in Tennessee v. Lane. He said, "I know that case,
that is the case where the guy was in a wheelchair and had
to crawl up the stairs to get to the courthouse . . .." I
thought, wow, even the taxi driver knows about it. He said
"I have a view on the case." Being used to D.C. cab drivers
I was not sure I wanted to ask what his view was, but I took
my life in my hands and asked. He said, "I think it is very
simple. We can make Burger Kings accessible, why can't
we make courthouses accessible?" I was strongly reminded
of that comment when Mr. Lane told us about his K.I.S.S.
motto earlier today.
I have to start with a caveat here. I am an antitrust
lawyer, not a civil rights lawyer. I became involved in this
case when my firm was lucky enough to be asked to
participate in writing an amicus brief in the first of the
sovereign immunity ADA cases in the Supreme Court, the
1 Elizabeth McCallum is a partner at Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White,
LLP, in Washington, D.C.
2 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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Garrett case.3 I was pulled in on that brief, and then we
wrote another amicus brief in the Hason,4 the California
case that was dismissed. Then we wrote another amicus
brief in Lane, and in that case the plaintiffs finally got their
win.
The amicus briefs we drafted in Garrett, Hason, and
Lane focused on the history of state-sponsored
discrimination against people with disabilities. Our goal
was to focus on the portion of the City of Boerne case that
says Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment as a response to a pervasive history
of state-sponsored discrimination or unconstitutional
behavior in the area. 5 We tried to focus our Lane brief in
response to some of the points the Court made in Garrett
about the kind of evidence that Congress could look at and
should consider when it is deciding whether to abrogate
sovereign immunity. We tried to focus on cases of
discrimination with the state as actor. We tried to focus on
instances that rose to the level of constitutional violations.
We tried to focus on not just some of the horrible things
that happened in the early years of the century, but also
things that happened close to the time when the ADA was
enacted.
In our Lane brief, we described a whole spectrum of
that kind of discrimination against people with disabilities.
Of course, we focused on discrimination in the provision of
judicial services and access to the courts, telling stories
similar to the stories that Ms. Jones and Mr. Lane told
about individuals being denied access to our judicial system
and buildings. We provided evidence of both individual
cases of discrimination against individuals in the judicial
system and also systemic, structural barriers that prevented
3 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
4 Med. Bd. of Cal. v. Hason, 538 U.S. 958 (2003).
5 City of Boere v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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access to courthouses. We also focused more broadly on a
number of other instances of state-sponsored discrimination
outside the specific context of judicial access. That
included discrimination in access to polling places and in
the ability to vote. It included discrimination in jury
service. It included some of the shameful history Ms.
Millett referred to of state sterilization of people with
disabilities. We described statutes, some still on the books,
that prevent people from disabilities from obtaining
marriage licenses and marrying freely. And, of course,
there are some heart wrenching instances that we described
of awful treatment of people with disabilities in institutions,
both people who are institutionalized unnecessarily and
people with disabilities who suffer horribly from
inappropriate and cruel treatment while they are
institutionalized and in prisons.
We were tremendously gratified and happy when
some of the instances of the history of state sponsored
discrimination that we talked about in our brief were some
of the same instances that Justice Stevens mentioned in his
majority opinion in Lane.6  I certainly do not mean to
suggest our brief was the only one that described these
kinds of instances. We were writing an amicus brief, so
our role was to amplify one important issue of the case
while the parties and the attorney general focused on the
broader implications. There were a number of briefs that
contained these kinds of descriptions, including the
fabulous brief that the Department of Justice prepared.
Here is one thing that was tremendously interesting
to me, and brings me to my substantive point about the
policy implications of Lane. As I told you, we worked on
the same brief recounting the history of state-sponsored
discrimination in the Garrett case and in the Hason case as
we did in the Lane case. It seems to me that the record in
Garrett presented a very similar set of historical facts about
6 541 U.S. at 524-27.
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the history of state-sponsored employment discrimination
against people with disabilities as the record in Lane
presented with respect to discrimination against people
with disabilities in the court system. There was the same
rich and substantive record before Congress when it
enacted Title I of the ADA that states had discriminated
against people with disabilities in employment as there was
when it enacted Title II that states had discriminated
against people with disabilities in the provision of public
facilities. But Garrett came out one way; Lane came out
the other way. Why the difference? I think that the
specific legislative findings that Congress issued in support
of Title II were helpful, as was the fact that the issue
involved in Lane was a deprivation of a fundamental right,
access to the courthouse. I also think that the two opinions,
Lane and Garrett, evidence in some aspects a
fundamentally different approach to analysis of the
legislative record. These different approaches may create
some uncertainty for litigants and lower courts.
What is certain after Lane? Plaintiffs now can sue
states for damages under the ADA for issues related to
access to the courts and the judicial system. That is certain,
and that is a tremendously important and a very significant
victory for people with disabilities. Also after Lane there is
far more scope for litigants to argue for an expansive
reading of the history of discrimination in the legislative
and public record. But the differences in the Lane and
Garrett approach to the analysis may continue to create
uncertainty about what courts can look at to determine if a
particular claim passes muster and what that evidence
means.
What are some of these differences? First, the
Garrett majority opinion, in a manner similar to Judge
Rehnquist's dissent in Lane, seemed to assume that the
historical record that Congress is required to consider when
it abrogates sovereign immunity is similar to the judicial
record a court would need to make a decision in a specific
55
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 548
case. Lane, in contrast, took a more expansive view of the
kind of evidence in the legislative record and the historical
record that will suffice for the requisite pattern and practice
of discrimination. It is more a difference of tone than of
anything actually articulated in the opinion, but the Lane
opinion was considerably more accepting of the concept
that Congress acts like a Congress. Congress is a
legislative body; it is supposed to consider all sorts of
evidence from the social and historical record; and it does
not have to develop a quasi-judicial record when enacting
legislation.
Second, I think the Garrett opinion seemed to
suggest that only evidence related to the statute at issue
counted, i.e., evidence in Garrett of state-sponsored
discrimination in employment. The Lane Court, although it
limited its holding to upholding Title II "as applied" to
access to the courts, also looked at evidence of past
discrimination from a whole variety of other areas and
concluded that that evidence showed that Title II as a whole
was enacted in the face of that extensive evidence.
7
Third, the Garrett opinion seemed to indicate that
any evidence of discrimination needed to be by the state
acting as a state. In contrast, the Lane Court, in a footnote,
recognized that local municipality activity, when the
7 "Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive unequal
treatment in the administration of state services and programs,
including systematic deprivations of fundamental rights," citing
discrimination in the areas of voting rights, institutionalization,
marriage, education, jury service, and others, id. at 524-25; "Given the
sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of
unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the
provision of public services, the dissent's contention that the record is
insufficient to justify Congress' exercise of its prophylactic power is
puzzling, to say the least," id. at 528; legislative finding, "together with
the extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes
clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services
and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for
prophylactic legislation," id. at 529.
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locality is acting as an arm of a state "counts" for purposes
of the sovereign immunity analysis.
8
Where are litigants and courts after Lane with
respect to the necessity of a historical record of
discrimination before Congress? It is like the proverbial
man feeling the elephant, everybody touches a different
place and comes to a different conclusion. After Lane and
Garrett, each side is going to argue its own particular view
of how you look at the historical record. In the end, the
Lane view is the correct one-Congress should not be
required to act like a court when it is enacting legislation.
In conclusion, Lane was a historic decision, one that
represented a significant victory for the plaintiffs and for all
people with disabilities. Thanks so much for the
opportunity to share my thoughts about this case with you
today.
81d. at 527 n.16.
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Tennessee v. Lane: Winning the Battle, Losing the War?
Michael Foreman' & Ossai Miazad
Good afternoon. I am very happy to be here. I
want to thank the dean, and Richard, I want to thank the
JOURNAL for hosting this symposium. I feel like the last
hitter in a long program with a lot of heavy hitters. It is
very difficult to do the follow-up. I am going to steal one
of Mr. Lane's mottos here, his K.I.S.S. theory, but I am
going to change it to "Keep It Short, Stupid." I will attempt
to keep it short.
For some of you who know of the Lawyer's
Committee, you may be asking why we are here. For those
of you who do not know of the Lawyer's Committee, I will
explain. The Committee was founded in 1963. We litigate
primarily race discrimination and sex discrimination class
actions across the country. While we do not have many
cases dealing with disability discrimination, the Lawyer's
Committee is concerned about the erosion of Congress'
power to legislate in the area of discrimination. The
Committee has been involved in many of the sentinel cases
dealing with discrimination. We filed an amicus brief in
the Lane2 case on behalf of NAACP lawyers. We were
also involved in the Boerne3 case. Our goal was to put a
stake in the ground so the court did not bleed over into the
sex discrimination area or possibly the race discrimination
area using the same theory. That is the victory in Lane is
important to us.
When Ms. Jones started the day, she summed up the
issue in front of you-you cannot sue the State. It has
1 Mr. Foreman serves as deputy director for legal programs at the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law. He is a frequent
speaker on civil rights issues and has served as counsel of record for the
Lawyer's Committee in several cases before the Supreme Court.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
3 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
59
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 552
sovereign immunity. I think her quote was something like
you cannot sue "the high and mighty."
I want to talk about what Lane is about in the big
perspective. This case represents a constitutional struggle
between the federal government's ability to regulate versus
the State's claim that they are sovereign and have the
power to act alone.
Since we are in a law school, I think we should do a
law school exercise. I am going to state a couple
principles. You will accept these principles, and then we
will decide the Lane case based on these principles. After
that, we will determine what it means for the future.
1. That the civil war amendments were passed to
take power away from the state and give it to the federal
government is not in debate. It has been the law for
centuries.
2. That Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
an affirmative grant of power to the federal government to
regulate the states. That is not in debate.
The debate is centered on the standard used to shift
power. Chief Justice Marshall expressed his standard by
stating, "Let the end be legitimate and all means are
appropriate." This sentiment was the beginning of what we
call the "rational means" test. The test asks "are Congress'
actions a rational means to accomplish its goals?" For
almost two centuries, the rational means test had been the
law. A more modem example of this rational means test
can be found in Katzenbach.4 In 1966, the Supreme Court
held that the legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
fact-finding and may be based on a rational speculation,
again as long as what Congress does is by rational means.
Now if you take that constitutional test and apply it
to the Lane situation, is what Congress did rational? I think
almost everybody has to come to the conclusion that it is
rational.
4 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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So why is that not the end of the case? Because in
1997 the Court adopted a "congruence in proportionality"
test. What does that mean? We talked about some of the
cases-City of Boerne, Kimel,5 and Garrett.6 These cases
held that there needs to be a very close match between what
is in the legislative record and how Congress chooses to
regulate it.
What does that do? It has the courts examining the
legislative record.
I believe there are a lot of things wrong with the
"congruence of proportionality." Unfortunately, it is clear
from the current jurisprudence that this Court is not going
to move away from it. So we are trying to convince the
Court that when they say "congruence in proportionality,"
what they really mean is "rational means." We need to
because the new test ignores how Congress works.
Congress is not a courtroom; it is not a factfinder. For any
of you who have done legislative work, it resembles a
sausage factory. You do not want to see what goes in there
and probably cannot imagine what goes into it. So, trying
to look at the record and come up with a coherent pattern is
really tying Congress' hands in two ways.
One way is to justify statutes that have already been
passed, which the solicitor's office is going to have to fight
continually. It limits Congress in what they can do in
future legislation, like in areas of sexual orientation or other
areas of controversial legislation. Second, determine what
kind of record Congress has to adopt to move into
controversial areas. It is virtually impossible for them to
adopt this test.
Where does Tennessee v. Lane fit in this?
Obviously it is a victory for Ms. Jones, Mr. Lane, and Mr.
Brown. I think it is a tremendous victory to get the Court
5 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
6 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
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to use the "as applied" test. The Plaintiffs took an
extremely hard case against an extremely hard
jurisprudence and won it.
Where does Lane fit in the larger constitutional
area? For us, it is another step along the way that the Court
here said, "Yes, as applied here, it is constitutional."
Why was it constitutional? Because we are dealing
with one of the most fundamental rights we have, the
access to courts.
What does this case say about the hockey rink or the
ice skating rink? We are not sure and that will be the
problem with the case moving forward. It guarantees each
and every one of these issues will continue to be litigated.
There was a comment made earlier, I think it was
by Mr. Lane, that we are taking a ton of money and putting
it in litigation and defending it. We could take a lot of
money and put it in disability rights issues and solve these
issues. It is not a hypothetical concern, and given our time
I will quickly move through this. Right now the courts are
grappling with it. You used the example of a skating rink.
I am not sure a skating rink will survive the same
constitutional challenge that we did here.
Recently, in the case of Association for Disabled
Americans v. Florida International University,7 the
Eleventh Circuit Court said education did survive the test,
and that it was different from other rights that are only
subject to rational review. Again, focusing on either
classifications like race or sex, they are subjected to a
higher level of scrutiny or a fundamental right. But in
Cochran v. Pinchak,8 the Third Circuit held that a disabled
prisoner was not denied a fundamental right when he was
not allowed access to books, a talking watch, and a usable
7 405 F.3d 954 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
" 401 F.3d 184 (3rd Cir. 2005). Note, after this symposium, rehearing
was granted and the judgment vacated. See 412 F.3d 500 (3rd Cir.
2005).
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walking cane. Therefore, the Tennessee v. Lane analysis
did not apply.
The Fourth Circuit in 2004, in another claim by a
prisoner that he was not provided with timely refills of his
prescriptions, went to the Lane decision. 9 The quote was,
"it appears that the actual holding [in Lane] is fairly narrow
and is limited to the class of cases implicating the
fundamental right of access to the courts."'  A district
court case took the opposite view in education and said the
right to education was not a fundamental right. Another
case, out of the Southern District of New York, held that a
person with disability seeking admission to the bar did not
pose a challenge implicating a fundamental right, and
therefore, Tennessee v. Lane did not apply. So what we are
left with is unfortunately litigating a lot of these issues on a
case by case basis unless the Supreme Court can somehow
be pushed back into some rational means of review where
they are not second guessing the wisdom of Congress.
Unfortunately, given today's climate and where we
are going, I do not see it happening. I would hope that the
states decide, rather than putting the money into the
litigation of these cases, to put it into improving
accessibility. The need for these cases would hopefully
evaporate as we move forward. Thank you very much.
9 See Spencer v. Easter, 109 Fed. Appx. 571 (Va. 2004).
101d. at 573.
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Appendix
Tennessee Judicial Branch Americans with Disabilities Act
Policy Regarding Access to Judicial Programs
I. Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
12131 et seq., prohibits discrimination against any qualified
individual with a disability. Pursuant to the provisions of
the ADA and 28 C.F.R. 35.130, the Judicial Branch of the
State of Tennessee does not permit discrimination against
any individual on the basis of physical or mental disability
in accessing or participating in its judicial programs.
Consistent with this policy, the Judicial Branch for the
State of Tennessee shall conduct its services, programs or
activities, when viewed in their entirety, in a manner that is
readily accessible to and usable by qualified individuals
with disabilities. This standard does not require that each
existing facility be accessible, but rather ensures "program
accessibility" which may be provided by methods including
alteration of existing facilities, acquisition or construction
of additional facilities, relocation of a service or program to
an accessible facility, or provision of services at alternate
sites. In choosing among available methods for meeting
this requirement, the State of Tennessee shall give priority
to those methods that offer the services, programs and
activities of the Judicial Program in the most integrated
setting appropriate. In furtherance of this policy and to
ensure that those responsible for the administration of
justice have a set of guidelines from which they will be
able to execute this policy, the following guidelines and
principles are hereby adopted.
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II. Standards For Access To The Judicial Program Of
The State Of Tennessee
1. The Tennessee Judicial Branch will provide
reasonable modifications in its rules, policies, services and
practices, when necessary, to provide effective access to a
qualified individual with a disability. A "reasonable
modification" may include, but is not limited to, making a
change in or exception to policies, practices, and
procedures; furnishing, at no charge, to the qualified
individual with disability auxiliary aids and services, which
include but are not limited to equipment, devices, materials
in alternative formats, and qualified interpreters or readers;
and relocating judicial programs, services or activities to
alternate accessible facilities or alternate accessible sites; or
making each service, program or activity, when viewed in
its entirety, readily accessible to be usable by qualified
persons with a disability requesting modifications.
2. In the event that the reasonable modification
requires relocation of a judicial program, service or activity
to an alternate facility or site, the alternate facility or site
shall comply with the requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Tennessee Public Buildings
Accessibility Act. The alternate facility or site shall also
comply with Tennessee law concerning the location of
county courthouses.
3. The Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator in
a county where the county courthouse is not ADA
compliant, shall maintain a list of alternate facilities or sites
that may be used for relocation of judicial programs,
services and activities. An up to date copy of the alternate
facility or site list shall be submitted to the Tennessee
Judicial Program ADA Coordinator.
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4. The following terms are relevant to the operation
of this policy. These definitions are derived from the
provisions of 28 C.F.R § 35.104. Other definitions material
to the operation of this policy but not otherwise contained
herein may be found at 28 C.F.R § 35.104.
(a) Disability means, with respect to an individual, a
physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; a record of such an impairment; or
being regarded as having such an impairment.
(b) Facility means all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling
stock or other conveyances, roads, walks,
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal
property, including the site where the building,
property, structure or equipment is located.
(c) Individual with a disability means a person who
has a disability.
(d) Qualified individual with a disability means an
individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modification to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity.
5. The Tennessee Judicial Branch has Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator, employed by the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), who oversees
the administration of this policy, any complaints associated
with issues raised by this policy, and Requests for
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Modification under the Americans with Disabilities Act
within the Judicial Branch, and will have the ultimate
responsibility for compliance with this policy....
6. The Tennessee Judicial Program ADA
Coordinator will designate a Local Judicial Program ADA
Coordinator for each county in a judicial district, who will
be responsible for handling all Requests for Modification to
access judicial programs, activities and services within that
county. The Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator
should be involved with or familiar with the judicial
program of the county.
II. Request For Modification For Access To Judicial
Programs
7. Submission of Request. Persons requiring
modification to obtain access to judicial programs, services
or activities at any facility used for such purposes should
contact the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator
(Coordinator). A written Request for Modification is
preferred. However, this request may be made by
telephone to the Coordinator. In such instances, the
Coordinator shall commit such requests to writing. The
Coordinator shall maintain a record of all Requests for
Modification. A Request for Modification form is
available and may be obtained from the Local Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator, the Tennessee Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator, any court clerk's office, or
online at www.tsc.state.tn.us. If appropriate or upon
request, the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator or
the Tennessee Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will
provide assistance with writing and submitting the written
request for Modification. Large print and Braille versions
of the Request form are available upon request.
If appropriate, other personnel associated with the
judicial program, service or activity may assist the
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applicant in the submission of a completed Request for
Modification to the Coordinator.
The written Request for Modification shall include
a description of the person's disability, the role of the
person in the judicial proceeding, the Modification sought,
the date and time of the Modification requested, and the
judicial proceeding for which the Modification is sought.
Once a Request for Modification has been granted, the
Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will advise the
applicant of the procedure to be followed with regard to
subsequent proceedings associated with the original
Request. If necessary, the Local Judicial Program ADA
Coordinator may require the applicant to provide additional
information about the qualifying disability in order to
determine the appropriate Modification to meet the
applicant's needs, but only such information that may be
required to make such a determination. Under no
circumstances will the Local Judicial Program ADA
Coordinator be permitted to request information regarding
the applicant's disability that is not necessary for the
evaluation of the Modification requested.
8. Who Should Submit a Request for Modification.
An application requesting Modification may be submitted
by any lawyer, party, witness, juror or other individual with
an interest in attending any judicial program, activity or
service or another person on behalf of such interested
person.
9. When to Submit a Request. The Request for
Modification should be submitted with as much advance
notice as possible, but in any event should be made no less
than five (5) business day prior to the date for which the
Modification is sought. An immediate request for
Modification should be made when urgent and/or
emergency circumstances arise. In criminal cases where a
defendant is confined to jail, the Request for Modification
69
1:4 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 562
should be made as soon as possible. However, it may be
necessary that the Request for Modification may be made
contemporaneously with his or her initial court appearance.
10. When There Is No Request. In the event that a
person requiring a Modification has not made a timely
Request for Modification, the court may, in its discretion,
immediately grant such Modification without requiring an
advance written request. In such a case, a request for
Modification form shall be completed by either the person
requesting Modification or court personnel for the court's
records. Alternately, the court may, in its discretion,
postpone, reschedule or otherwise delay the judicial
program, service or activity affected. Under such
circumstances, the individual requesting Modification shall
be required to immediately submit a written request. If
appropriate or upon request, court personnel will provide
assistance with writing and submitting the request for
Modification.
11. Provision of Reasonable Modification. The
Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator will, as soon as
practicable, notify the requesting individual of the
Modification to be provided. An alternate Modification
may be offered instead of the requested Modification if the
Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator determines that
another equally effective Modification is available.
12. Additional Time to Achieve Modifications. If
the Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinator determines
that additional time may be necessary in order to achieve
and/or obtain Modification, the Local Judicial Program
ADA Coordinator shall notify the judge presiding over the
matter, who will determine an appropriate course of action.
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13. Denial of a Request for Modification. A request
for Modification may be denied only if the Local Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator fmds that:
(a) The person making the request is not a qualified
individual with a disability; or,
(b) The requested Modification would create an
undue financial or administrative burden; or,
(c) The requested Modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the judicial
program, service or activity; or,
(d) Some other Modification would be as effective
and involve less cost or inconvenience; or,
(e) The applicant has refused to comply with this
Policy; or,
(f) The applicant's failure to comply with this
Policy makes impossible or impracticable the ability
to provide the requested Modification.
14. No employee of the Judicial Branch of the State
of Tennessee shall retaliate against any person who
exercises his/her rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act or who requests modification pursuant to
this policy.
IV. Appeal Of An Adverse Decision As To A Request
For Modification
15. Appeal to Presiding Judge of Judicial District.
If a Request for Modification is denied or the offered
alternate Modification is unsatisfactory to the applicant, the
applicant may appeal the decision of the Local Judicial
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Program ADA Coordinator to the presiding judge of the
judicial district within ten (10) days of the denial of
Modification or offer of alternate Modification. The judge
shall rule on the appeal as soon as practicable, and where
possible, in advance of the date of the hearing for which the
Modification is requested.
16. Appeal to Administrative Office of the Courts.
If an applicant is dissatisfied with the ruling of the
presiding judge resulting from a request for review, the
decision may be appealed to the Director of the
Administrative Office of the Courts, or her designee, within
ten (10) days of the ruling by the presiding judge on the
request for review. A written request must include any
reasons for disagreement with the previous determinations,
as well as the remedy sought. The Director shall provide a
ruling as to the request as expeditiously as possible.
V. Public Notice
17. A public notice shall be posted in visible places
throughout each facility where judicial programs, services
and/or activities are held, including but not limited to each
court clerk's office, that identifies the Local Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator and the Tennessee Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator. Such public notice shall also
provide a website address where a copy of this policy,
implementation guidance, and Request for Modification
form may be obtained electronically. Should the
courthouse facility within which judicial programs, services
and/or activities are provided be inaccessible, a public
notice shall be posted on the outside of the building or at
another such location at or near the building that is readily
accessible.
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VI. Notice On Documents Compelling Court
Participation
18. When a summons, subpoena, juror summons or
other pleading, order or document compelling participation
in a judicial program, service or activity is issued, said
documents shall provide notice of the identity of the Local
Judicial Program ADA Coordinator, the Tennessee Judicial
Program ADA Coordinator and a specific designation as to
how each may be contacted, including telephone numbers
and email addresses. Such notice shall also provide
information about program accessibility and the procedure
for submission of requests for reasonable modifications.
Such notice shall also provide a website address where a
copy of this policy and Request for Modification request
form may be obtained electronically.
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